P ierre Poilievre’s defiant stand against securing his top-level security clearance has emerged as one of the more baffling moments of this early election season. What is driving a seemingly irrational resistance to a procedure that’s standard for someone in the role of leader of the opposition—and, potentially, the next prime minister? What strategic advantage could possibly come from avoiding classified briefings on foreign interference?
To make sense of this, I reached out to Wesley Wark, a Canadian historian and leading expert on national security and intelligence. Wark has served on multiple government advisory councils and has followed the politics of institutional oversight for decades. I asked him, by email, what might be behind Poilievre’s decision—and why it could matter more than is apparent.
Let’s start at the beginning. What is a security clearance? How do you get it?
A security clearance is a grant of access to an employee of the federal government (or a contractor) for classified information, on the basis of an employee’s “need to know.” It is based on a Treasury Board policy called “The New Standard on Security Screening,” which dates from 2015.
An individual makes an application through an online process, which requires personal details about such things as education, residence history, past employment, financial history and credit score, travel, marital status; family details; engagement with foreign governments and officials. It is designed to establish loyalty and reliability. The application goes to Canadian Security Intelligence Service for screening. CSIS then makes a recommendation to the relevant deputy head of a federal department or agency. It can be a time-consuming process, taking up to a year or more for higher-level clearances.
Why do you need it?
Without a current security clearance, a federal government employee can’t access relevant classified information. So having one is essential to being hired and continuing your employment. There are two streams of security clearances—regular and “enhanced”—and three general levels of clearances: reliability, secret, top secret. Almost all federal government employees will have secret clearances. New hires and those working on temporary contracts will normally have reliability to begin. Officials working at CSIS and Communications Security Establishment must have top secret clearances and must undergo polygraph testing. Top secret clearances are good for five years, secret clearances for ten. They can be renewed through a further application process.
Some political actors, such as opposition party leaders and specially selected party representatives, may have security clearances up to the top secret level. Among opposition party leaders, Poilievre is alone in refusing to apply for a security clearance. Leaders of the New Democratic Party, Bloc Québécois, and Green Party all have top secret security clearances, as do those who are appointed as members of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.
What sort of things get shared at the top secret level?
Top secret information generally involves what is called “high side” information, often drawn from sensitive intelligence gathering conducted by organizations like CSIS and CSE. Intelligence shared with us by our Five Eyes partners will also often be classified as top secret.
A recipient of a highly classified briefing or document might, for example, receive an intelligence report from CSIS containing information it acquired through surveillance of an adversary foreign diplomat or embassy. Someone with need-to-know access to CSE foreign signals intelligence might receive a report documenting Russian breaches of a ceasefire agreement with Ukraine or the movements of elements of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Someone receiving top secret information from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police might learn details of a planned or foiled terrorist plot.
There is a lot of this kind of reporting circulating in the Canadian government.
Does Poilievre’s argument for not obtaining the necessary security clearance make sense to you?
The stance makes no sense to anyone who understands the nature of security clearances. Poilievre clearly believes that having a top secret clearance and access to classified intelligence would gag him. He also claims to believe that any such process would be politicized and controlled by the government. In fact, political leadership does not dictate to CSIS or any other security or intelligence agency what they can share. That determination is made by the agency that controls the information on the basis of what any recipient might “need to know.” As for being “gagged,” of course, Poilievre would be in breach of the Security of Information Act were he to discuss in public, without permission, any details of the information shared with him.
But the benefit of having a top secret clearance is to be able to better understand the threat environment that the country faces and better understand any foreign interference activities directed at his own party. Poilievre would be free to make policy decisions about the Conservative Party’s approach to national security and to make decisions about protecting the integrity of his own party, based upon the classified information he might receive.
Assuming Poilievre knows all this already, why do you think he would turn away the clearance? What’s your assessment of his motives? Is it rooted in principle or political calculation?
I believe his stance is rooted in political calculation. He wants complete freedom to criticize the government for alleged inactions.
But how does this stunt give him that freedom? Does it help portray him as an outsider challenging government bureaucracy?
It gives him freedom to say whatever he wants, unchecked by more nuanced knowledge of the facts. As for donning an outsider position, well, that would be to wrap himself in a Trumpian/right-wing Republican mantle. I doubt he wants to do that.
And remember, he is also locked into this stance. It dates back to his refusal to get cleared to read the classified annex to David Johnston’s report as independent special rapporteur on foreign interference in May 2023. Having locked himself into a position at that time, he was unable to find a way out to allow himself to read the classified version of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians special report on foreign interference issued in June 2024 or to be briefed on foreign interference subsequently. He is a prisoner of his own initial bad decisions, even while the geopolitical situation has fundamentally altered with the Donald Trump presidency.
Why does that geopolitical situation change the picture? As you say, he has taken this stance before. Has the mood shifted because we’re in an election?
We now confront an unprecedented threat from the United States which was in no one’s imagination back in 2023. A political party leader has to understand this.
Some observers suggest Poilievre is avoiding security clearance to maintain plausible deniability about potential foreign interference in his party, particularly regarding Indian interference. Would you agree?
No, I don’t buy that argument. The allegations are already out there, so Poilievre is not maintaining much deniability. He is just leaving himself unable to answer.
And maybe the other risk is he invites speculation about whether he has something to hide or fears what the vetting process might uncover?
The cover-up theory seems very unlikely to me. Poilievre did serve as a cabinet minister in Stephen Harper’s government and would have gone through a security vetting process for that post. He has lived in the public eye for virtually all of his adult life.
Might his refusal also reflect a broader politicization of national security, opening the door to politicians weaponizing national security rather than protecting it?
His refusal to accept a security clearance and get briefings is a political act, but that is a different thing from politicizing national security. It is in the nature of opposition politics in a democracy to politicize national security to some degree, to use it as a weapon to attack the government, or to hold it to account.
Fair enough. But you also seem to see Poilievre’s refusal as something beyond the usual confrontational cut and thrust of parliamentary debate.
In the beginning, it was part of partisan politics as usual, especially around the high-temperature issue of foreign interference, when all eyes were on the alleged shortcomings of the Liberal government’s handling of the file. Over time, Poilievre boxed himself into a corner and is now being dogged by an old story come back to life about Indian government interference in his leadership contest in 2022. Had he obtained a security clearance, he would have been better able to respond to those allegations.
Could Poilievre’s stance resonate with his base of supporters who are skeptical of government institutions?
I am doubtful of this. What might resonate would be the claim that he wants to be free to attack the government, a claim easier to make if people misunderstand, willfully or otherwise, the context surrounding possession of a security clearance.
What message does Poilievre’s refusal send to Canada’s intelligence agencies and allies?
The message is a concerning one: that Poilievre fundamentally does not value intelligence reporting. That is a very dangerous stance to take for an opposition party leader who wants to form the next government. For our allies—or those that remain—it would be considered a baffling decision that would raise questions about Poilievre’s political judgment.
I guess I’m wondering what that danger could be. Could his stance embolden foreign actors by showing that Canada’s political leadership is divided on national security?
The danger is that Poilievre has put himself in a position where he cannot fully protect the integrity of his own party and has blinded himself to what government intelligence agencies know about domestic and international security threats. When it comes to security, ignorance is never bliss, especially not for the head of a major political party. Such ignorance means he cannot fully fashion security policy approaches for his party, and if the party gains office, he will be coming to the security threat environment with his previous blinders on.
It almost sounds like you feel this might be a disqualifying act—that no potential prime minister should behave this way in the face of credible threats to Canadian democracy?
Poilievre would have to change his ways and accept the importance of intelligence were he to become prime minister. I imagine he would also want to offer the opportunity of security clearances to opposition leaders, so that would carry some irony with it.
